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Sovereignty is an illusion: the UK should use its power-
sharing experience to play a constructive role in the EU
blogs.lse.ac.uk /brexit/2016/02/29/sovereignty-is-an-illusion-the-uk-should-embrace-its-experience-of-power-
sharing-at-home-in-order-to-play-a-constructive-role-in-the-eu/
The UK’s ‘Westminster model’ of sovereign governance has had its day, claim Jo Murkens and Simon
Toubeau. They argue that the recent transformation of the British party system and devolution
have eroded the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty. The British government should learn from these
developments when dealing with the EU, where sovereignty and power are also shared between
the political union and its constituent parts. This is especially relevant to the Brexit discussions,
since beyond the immediate horizon, the UK shares the long-term challenges of its European
partners, conclude the authors.
A fascination with control
David Cameron returned from Brussels with the most politically feasible deal for the renegotiation of
Britain’s terms of membership in the EU. The outcome is a far cry from the ambitious set of reforms
he laid out in his Bloomberg speech of 2013. But, nevertheless, having secured a special status in
the economic governance of the EU and an “emergency brake” of temporary four year suspension
of in-work benefits of EU migrants, he feels confident that the UK now has the best of both worlds:
the access, affluence and security of membership are now balanced by greater national control.
Control over borders, control over policy, control over the future evolution of the EU. And this allows him to
recommend to the British people that they should vote to remain ‘in’.
His opponents naturally disagree. The weakness of national control is in fact the main reason for them that
Cameron’s deal does not go far enough and that the UK should head for the exit. The emblematic Brexiter, Nigel
Farage, asked: “why can’t we veto a bad law, why is it costing us over £50 million a day, and why do we have an
open door to over 500 million people?” Euro-sceptics within Cameron’s own Conservative party share this
fascination. A handful of cabinet members, fortified by support from the London mayor, have banded together in
favour of exit under the slogan: “Let’s take back control”. To this, Cameron has responded that leaving the EU would
simply give the ‘illusion’ of sovereignty.
The ideal of sovereignty
One would be hard-pressed to find a domestic politician or voter who did not want to reclaim sovereignty from the
EU or shore up our parliamentary democracy against bureaucrats in Brussels. But would a return to the centralised
rule of a sovereign parliament be possible simply by withdrawing from the EU? We argue that external factors like
EU membership are only partly responsible for eroding parliamentary sovereignty. The greatest ‘losses’ have
stemmed from domestic developments, and the UK government should learn from these when dealing with the EU.
Political scientists have long thought of the UK as the paragon of Westminster model of government. It derives its
main assumptions from the constitutional tradition of the late nineteenth century. The model focuses on the
institution of Parliament: parliament acts as the absolute ‘sovereign’ law-maker; it is dominated by a single-party
government whose authority is strengthened by the exaggerating effects of the ‘first past the post’ (FPTP) electoral
system; government ministers are, in turn, accountable to Parliament. The absence of entrenched ‘constitutional’
laws, combined with weak judicial review, keeps the UK’s historic constitution eminently ‘flexible’.
The conditions for parliamentary sovereignty however no longer exist. Sovereignty and centralism have become
illusionary because they have given way to power-sharing and divided government within the UK. This is mainly due
to domestic changes in the practice of government, rather than to EU membership: the transformation of the British
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party system and the process of devolution have laid to rest any notion that the British parliament is the supreme law
maker.
Constitutional Convention derivative work: Bluszczokrzew (Constitution_Pg1of4_AC.jpg) [Public domain],
Wikimedia Cmms
The demise of an ideal
The disconnect between the vote share of parties and their representation in the House of Commons was laid bare
in the last general election. Britain no longer features the two-party system once dominated by the Labour and
Conservative parties that governed in alteration during most of the post-war period. In 1951, almost 98% of the
electorate voted either Conservative or Labour, compared to 67% at the last General Election. This is a direct result
of the groundswell of support for other party alternatives- UKIP, the SNP, the Greens and the Lib Dems- which, in
2010, forced the Tories to govern in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. But both the fragmentation of the party
system and the coalition government run clearly counter to the ideal of the Westminster model.
Moreover, constitutional transformations since 1997 have reduced the UK government’s policy reach in Scotland,
Wales, and Northern Ireland. Devolved governments now have the power to pass laws in a number of policy areas
from healthcare, education and housing, to transport and policing that differ from those passed by Westminster.
More importantly, consider clause 2 of the Scotland Bill 2015 by which the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish
Government become ‘a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements’. If passed, this clause
will entrench devolution against the legislative reaches of the Westminster Parliament – which is nothing short of
revolutionary in constitutional terms. So with respect to the government of regions now ruled by devolved bodies,
the Westminster model has also effectively ceased to exist.
To put it differently, the major political changes and constitutional reforms of the past 20 years have given rise to
practices more typical of a federal system than of the Westminster model, such as the sharing of power, the
decentralisation of authority, and the coordination of policy between different parties and governments. In the
absence of a better name, Vernon Bogdanor has referred to the new settlement as the New British Constitution.
Power-sharing with the EU
These domestic transformations and their effect on the rising practice of power-sharing should inform the UK’s
relationship with the EU.  The reality is that, much like at home, sovereignty and power in the EU are shared
between the political union and its constituent parts.
Political actors should understand that the Westminster model has had its day. Political parties have accumulated
ample experience of domestic power-sharing – from the negotiation on Capital Gains Tax with the Liberal
Democrats, to the allocation of financial resources to fund the Scottish Government’s new powers – and this
experience should be drawn upon to make its engagement within the EU more constructive.
How? The first step is to recognise that the major crises currently afflicting the EU – the tribulations of the Eurozone,
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the movement of Syrian refugees and the renewed threat of Russia – will affect British economic and security
interests whether the country is ‘in’ or ‘out’. Beyond the immediate horizon, the UK shares the long-term challenges
of its European partners: tackling falling labour productivity, reducing carbon emissions, developing green
technologies. By choosing to stay ‘out’, the UK will be deprived of any influence over the way these crises are
resolved and challenges confronted.
The second step is for the UK government is to wield influence by forming coalitions with other European nations
and by restoring its role as a constructive reformer of the EU. The UK has an illustrious tradition of helping to reform
the EU in a positive way, while securing a special status in its national interest: pushing for the Single European Act
and enhancing the competitiveness of the European economy; reforming the allocations of the European budget
from farm subsidies to industrial, technological and social investments. The UK should now seek to build bridges
with its estranged traditional allies – the Netherlands, the Nordics, and Germany – in order to shape the European
policies that will help itself and the continent to navigate these turbulent seas.
As the referendum campaign gathers pace, the UK should embrace its experience of power-sharing to engage with
the EU and to make this the most compelling story for its continued membership.
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